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Abstract—The popularity of digital currencies, especially cryptocurrencies, has been continuously growing since the appearance of
Bitcoin. Bitcoin’s security lies in a proof-of-work scheme, which requires high computational resources at the miners. Despite advances
in mobile technology, existing cryptocurrencies cannot be maintained by mobile devices due to their low processing capabilities.
Mobile devices can only accommodate mobile applications (wallets) that allow users to exchange credits of cryptocurrencies. In this
work, we propose LocalCoin, an alternative cryptocurrency that requires minimal computational resources, produces low data traffic
and works with off-the-shelf mobile devices. LocalCoin replaces the computational hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin’s security
with the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to a transaction are colluders. Localcoin features (i) a lightweight proof-of-work
scheme and (ii) a distributed blockchain. We analyze LocalCoin for double spending for passive and active attacks and prove that
under the assumption of sufficient number of users and properly selected tuning parameters the probability of double spending is close
to zero. Extensive simulations on real mobility traces, realistic urban settings, and random geometric graphs show that the probability
of success of one transaction converges to 1 and the probability of the success of a double spending attempt converges to 0.
Index Terms—P2P, Ad-hoc networks, cryprocurrency
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1 Introduction
B itcoin, proposed by Nakamoto in 2009, is the mostpopular cryptocurrency [33]. Numerous cryptocurrencies
have been proposed thereafter and have attracted the atten-
tion of both financial and technological industries as well as
academia [11] [13] [29]. All the digital currencies that were
proposed before Bitcoin, follow the client/server model with
transactions possible only between the currency provider and
the users (PAYPAL, VISA, MASTERCARD, etc). Bitcoin, in
contrast, works in a decentralised manner.
Decentralised cryptocurrencies have to deal with three
main challenges: (i) Proof of ownership- users should be
able to prove they have the amount of money they claim
to have. (ii) Double spending avoidance - a defense
mechanism against double spending. (Users are not able to
spend the same money more than once). (iii) Incentives -
for its stakeholders. Common characteristics of all the existing
cryptocurrencies are: (i) Internet based (ii) use computation-
ally expensive techniques to deal with double spending attacks
and (iii) require lots of data storage. To become part of the
Bitcoin peer network anyone can contribute their resources
and work as a miner. Bitcoin, as well as other less popular
cryptocurrencies, require their miners to employ devices with
high computational capabilities and to be interconnected via
the Internet. These requirements play a vital role in the qual-
ity and the guarantees of the protocols as well as in the miners’
revenue. All the transactions are stored in a public ledger
named blockchain in sets of blocks that are created by the
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miners [3]. Bitcoin requires fromminers to solve cryptographic
puzzles, which can only be solved by brute force SHA-256
hashing, in order to generate new blocks for the blockchain
[24] [36]. Each block has size of 1 MB and two consecutive
blocks are created with 10 minutes time difference, on average.
Miners earn bitcoins whenever they successfully mine a new
block and put it in the blockchain. The transactions that are
included in a mined block are selected by the miner who
successfully mined it. The probability of a miner to mine
a block is proportional to the portion of the computational
resources of the Bitcoin network he controls. The probability
of a transaction to be included in a mined block is proportional
to the transaction fees the miner will earn if the block is mined.
This gives lower priority to small transactions.
Cryptocurrencies are inferior to conventional currencies,
because users cannot exchange money without an Internet
connection. Mobile wallets are mobile applications that allow
anyone who owns credits from a cryptocurrency to create
transactions in a similar way as the mobile applications that
are offered by banks. The role of mobile devices in such
scenarios is limited to the submission of the transaction to
the authority that maintains the currency, which can be
either a decentralised network (Bitcoin) or a mobile phone-
based money transfer service (M-Pesa [1]). Mobile devices are
practically unable to partake as peers in any decentralised
cryptocurrency, because of (i) their lower processing capa-
bilities compared to conventional hardware specialised for
mining [41] and (ii) their unstable connectivity to the Internet
compared to ordinary wire-line access protocols. For example,
consider a university campus which might be spread across an
area of some km2 with several thousands of users with smart-
phones. These smartphones can be used to deploy Bitcoin-
like currency. However, these devices cannot compete with
Bitcoin miners in the block creation process and this gives no
incentives to their owners to employ them. Despite that, with
widespread usage of smartphones, which are equipped with
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2technologies such as WiFi-direct, NFC and so on, such users
can be easily interconnected.
The problem that we address in this paper is whether
we can develop a cryptocurrency, called LocalCoin, that re-
quires neither an Internet connection nor devices with high
computational capabilities and is based on the connectivity
between users that opportunistically exchange messages. We
imagine LocalCoin to complement global-scale cryptocurren-
cies by handling small transactions without the huge mining
expense of Bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies. Localcoin wallets
can get charged from Bitcoin wallets through ATM-machine
like nodes in the LocalCoin network.
1.1 Our Contributions
We propose LocalCoin, a scheme that replaces the computa-
tional hardness that is at the root of Bitcoin’s security with
the social hardness of ensuring that all witnesses to a transac-
tion are colluders (users assisting the malicious user to double
spend). Where computational hardness provides a weakest-
link security guarantee - it suffices to break the scheme once -
the social hardness provides a strongest-link guarantee: if just
one witness to the transaction is not cooperating, the scheme
cannot be broken. This makes it possible to apply the same
idea in mobile environments without sufficient computation
power or internet connectivity, while taking advantage of its
distributed nature [40].
(1) We are dealing with the proof of ownership issue by
proposing a distributed block chain and requiring users to at
least store the blocks containing their transactions.
(2) Regarding double spending attacks, we consider the
location of each user who verifies the creation of a new block.
We show that if the network of the users of LocalCoin is dense
enough, the probability of a double spending attempt to be
successful is upper bounded by the inverse of the square of
the number of users (Theorem 2). We also prove that the
probability of a double spending attempt to be successful by
a malicious user who can hire colluders to assist him in the
attack, is also very low (Theorem 3).
(3) We propose an incentive scheme based on transaction
and block fees that are adjusted to the ad-hoc networks in
order to encourage message exchange.
In addition to the theoretical analysis, we validate our
claims regarding the spread of transactions, the transaction
rates, and the double spending by extensive experiments on
(i) static graphs using tools from Random Geometric Graph
theory, (ii) city scale simulations with mobile users with the
help of the ONE simulator [26] as well as (iii) real data from
Infocom’05, Infocom’06 and Humanet datasets [6], [38].
1.2 Applicability of LocalCoin
We envision LocalCoin as a location-based cryptocurrency
that enables small payments1. Although the provided guar-
antees against double spending are probabilistic and leave a
small chance for a double spending attack to be successful,
the cost of manipulating the protocol by having a set of
colluders in the proper locations outweighs the gains when
the transactions are small. As we present in Section 6.2,
1. The technology needed to support the development of LocalCoin
is already mature since mobile devices have enough resources and
WiFi-direct is supported by every android version since October 2013.
an attacker needs to control many users, who need to be
incentivised to attack the protocol and loose their potential
earnings from the incentives provided by LocalCoin, in order
to split the network in two parts and perform a double
spending attack. In order for the chances for a double spending
attack to be negligible, the number of the participants has
to be high in order to guarantee high connectivity. Given
that the transaction verification speed in Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies depends on the transaction fees that will be
collected by the miners [2], small and local transactions are
too expensive and slow to be handled by Bitcoin. LocalCoin
can work in parallel with Bitcoin and send transactions to the
Bitcoin network that contain many senders and receivers and
are practically merged transactions. Technically, a LocalCoin
block can be a transaction in the Bitcoin network.
Apart from conventional money transactions, LocalCoin
can also be applied to mobile computing/networking applica-
tions such as computation offloading or downloading/stream-
ing services. Device-to-device (D2D) ecosystems have at-
tracted the research interest and various serverless architec-
tures and frameworks have been proposed. However, most of
them either do not consider incentives for the mobile users
that contribute their resources or imply the existence of a
centralised server that keeps track of the reliability and the
helpfulness of each user. LocalCoin can fill this gap and
complement any distributed credit-based incentive scheme for
D2D ecosystems.
2 Related Work
After Nakamoto’s original paper [33], many research groups
worked on various perspectives of the Bitcoin protocol.
Tschorsch and Scheuermann in their tutorial present the
existing contributions and results triggered by the proposal
of Bitcoin [42]. Garay et al. discussed applications, such as
the Byzantine agreement, that can be built on top of the Bit-
coin core network [21]. Darkcoin, Zerocoin and CoinShuffle,
motivated by the fact that a few transaction deanonymization
attacks have been reported, focus on the security and privacy
aspects of Bitcoin and propose extensions to fully anonymize
transactions [16] [31] [37]. Also, CoinJoin employs a multi-
signature scheme to enhance the transactions’ privacy [30].
CommitCoin shows a commitment scheme that harnesses the
existing computational power of the Bitcoin network [10].
Miller et al. present a formal model of anonymous and syn-
chronous processes that communicate using one-way public
broadcasts and prove that the Bitcoin protocol achieves con-
sensus in this model in almost any case [32]. Also Bruce J.D.
proposed a cryptocurrency that employs a mini-blockchain
with finite number of blocks in order to reduce the storage
requirements and improve efficiency [5].
Authors of [25] analyse the security of using Bitcoin
for fast payments, where the time between the exchange of
currency and goods is short. Furthermore, [39] investigates
the restrictions on the transaction processing rate in Bitcoin
as a function of both the bandwidth available to users and
the network delay, both of which lower the efficiency of
Bitcoin’s transaction processing. The security analysis done
by Bitcoin’s creator assumes that block propagation delays are
negligible compared to the time between the creation of two
consecutive blocks. This assumption fails when the protocol
3is required to process transactions at high rates. Eyal et al.
proposed Bitcoin-NG, the ‘next generation’ of Bitcoin the
design of which is based on scalability [18]. In more detail,
the latency is limited only by the propagation delay of the
network and the bandwidth of the capabilities of the miners.
Moreover, [19], [28] argue that the Bitcoin protocol is
not incentive-compatible and after presenting a game theo-
retic analysis they also present an attack in which colluding
miners obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. Also,
[34] introduces a new defence against this 51% attack via (i)
presenting a block header, (ii) introducing some extra bytes,
and (iii) utilising the time-stamp more effectively in the hash
generation. According to [14], Bitcoin only provides eventual
consistency. They propose PeerCensus, a new system, built
on the Bitcoin block chain, which enables strong consistency
and acts as a certification authority, manages peer identities
in a peer-to-peer network, and ultimately enhances Bitcoin
and similar systems with strong consistency.
3 Proposed Approach
As discussed earlier, cryptocurrencies have to address three
main challenges. We, first, explain how Bitcoin addresses these
challenges and then how LocalCoin encounters them.
3.1 Bitcoin
Proof of ownership: Bitcoin’s main achievement is its abil-
ity to reach a consensus about a valid transaction history in
a totally decentralised fashion. Bitcoin deals with the proof of
ownership problem by using the concept of block chain based
on a Merkle tree data structure. The block chain consists of
a sequence of blocks connected in a hash chain, where every
block imprints a set of transactions that have been collected
from the network. Every miner is aware of the creation of
a new block and consequently is able to validate the proof
of ownership of a claimed Bitcoins. Users can employ their
bitcoins by using a set of verified transactions. In order for
one transaction to be counted as verified it has to belong to a
block which is at least six blocks away from the current mined
block in the block chain.
Double spending avoidance: Bitcoin overcomes double
spending by using a proof-of-work mechanism that imposes
a delay on the verification of the transaction. In order to
overcome this mechanism, one has to solve a hard problem
with input that takes approximately 10 minutes for a brute
force algorithm to solve. There are three main ways to attempt
double spending in Bitcoin protocol: (i) race attack, (ii)
Finney attack and a (iii) 51% attack. Waiting for some new
blocks to be created based on the current one can easily
prevent the first two attacks; One block in the case of a race
attack and six in the case of a Finney attack. However a
51% attack can collapse the whole Bitcoin network but this is
extremely costly. Also, Eyal and Sirer prooved that proof-of-
work blockchains are vulnerable to selfish mining by attackers
that control more than 1/4 of the network’s mining power [19].
Incentives: Each miner gets a reward of 25 bitcoins for
mining a block [12]. However, this reward halves every 4 years.
Another concern is, as more and more users join as miners, the
probability of mining a successful block reduces. To partially
overcome this issue, miners create mining pools and they share
the earnings whenever one of them solves a cryptographic
puzzle [17].
3.2 LocalCoin
In this work, we propose a new Bitcoin-like cryprocurency
protocol, namely LocalCoin, for mobile ad-hoc networks in
urban areas with high device density.
Proof of ownership: LocalCoin uses a lightweight stor-
age architecture by extending the concept of blockchain in
a distributed fashion, where each user can store as many
blocks as she wants. The proposed distributed blockchain has
a redundancy factor between the users. LocalCoin, similarly
to Bitcoin, stores transactions into blocks. All the transactions
in the same block are collectively verified. The size of each
block is denoted by BS. In order for one block to be created a
minimum number of users to verify each transaction, denoted
by mVu, is needed (i.e., at least BS ·mVu users are informed
about each transaction on one block). The relationship of
these variables with the total amount of users affects the time
needed to verify one block and prove the ownership of all the
users that own these transactions.
Double spending avoidance: LocalCoin nullifies Bit-
coin’s computation overhead via incorporating a novel proto-
col, which is designed for the ad-hoc environment. Bitcoin’s
proof of work is based on the fact that cheating is improbable
because a malicious user has to solve hard problems at a faster
rate than the total remaining users. In LocalCoin, cheating is
made very difficult because a malicious user has to misinform
the majority of a set of trusted users. Every user in the
LocalCoin protocol selects the users she trusts. LocalCoin
avoids double spending in two ways. (i) The receiver of one
transaction will accept the transaction if and only if she
receives the transaction signed by at least a minimum number
of trusted users of her trusted network, denoted by mTr . This
constraint imposes a useful delay that spreads the transaction
message to more users and increases the probability of one
trusted user to detect the same input to another transaction.
It is worth mentioning that any initiated transaction is signed
by the sender and we assume that it is impossible for a mali-
cious user to fake a transaction by pretending to be another
user. (ii) During the block creation process, every participant
checks for double spending attempts. To avoid fake block
creation attempts by a set of collaborative malicious users,
LocalCoin enforces the average distance between the users that
will verify the creation of a new block to be more than aVd.
This last constraint allows the block creation messages to be
scattered to as many users as possible.
Incentives: We extend the transaction fee schema in
order to motivate mobile users to participate. We propose
transaction fees to motivate users to forward messages and
block fees to motivate them to store as many blocks from
the distributed block chain as possible. Transaction fees are
important because mobile users are competing for them and
they broadcast any received transaction. Every transaction
includes an amount of localcoins that are collected by the
mobile user who will first inform the receiver of the transaction
about the transaction. The probability of a mobile user to earn
the transaction fees does not depend on the technical char-
acteristics of their mobile device since D2D communication
protocols perform similarly in different devices. Block fees are
important because users store the created blocks in order to
be able to verify the creation of new ones. Whenever a block
is created, the mobile users that verified each transaction
4because they where aware of it share the localcoins that were
included in these transactions as block fees.
LocalCoin is a lightweight protocol because: (i) any user
has to only forward messages, (ii) a small subset of the total
users are checking for the validity of a transaction message
and (iii) users have to store the blocks that include their
own transactions. The feasibility of LocalCoin is proved using
concepts from random geometric graph (RGC) theory and
its performance is depicted with the help of static graphs
(Section 7.1), real trances from mobile users (Section7.2) and
simulations with mobile users in a city scale (Section 7.3). In
order to explain LocalCoin, we assume that it is deployed as a
service in an area2.
Examples: Figures 1a and 1b depict the broadcasting of a
transaction and a block creation. Alice broadcasts tAlice→Bob
to her neighbors who forward ti→j because they hope to
get the transaction fees. Their neighbors also forward the
transaction for the same reason and then Eric is the first who
informs Bob. If we assume for this example that mTr = 2,
after the reception of tAlice→Bob with the signatures of Chris
and David, Bob will broadcast his ack message and he will
announce Eric as the receiver of the transaction fees. This pair
of messages will be stored by at least Alice, Bob and Eric and
potentially more users that participated in the forwarding and
will be used in the block creation process. After collecting BS
transaction pairs, David broadcasts a block creation message,
Alice, Chris and Eric verify the block and Bob creates it since
the average distance between them is more than aV d and
mVu = 5.
Alice
Chris
David
Eric
Bob Chris and David
are trusted 
by Bob
Eric is the first 
who informs Bob 
about Alice's 
transaction
(a) Alice transfers localcoins to Bob (mTr = 2). Eric gets the
transaction fees.
David starts the 
block creation process
Chris verified 
the block
Bob created 
the block
Eric verified 
the block
Alice verified 
the block
(b) David builds a new block, Chris, Eric and Alice verify it
and Bob creates it. (mVu = 5, Average distance between David,
Chris, Eric, Alice and Bob > aVd).
Fig. 1: Transaction and Block creation examples.
2. Terms "service" and "protocol" appear in this paper and the
former is an implementation of the later.
Input: h(t∗→i(1)) h(t∗→i(2)) h(t∗→i(3)) . . .
Output oj oi trf ij bf ij bi
TABLE 1: Transaction Template.
4 The settings
We assume a set of mobile users U who are registered to
LocalCoin service. Every user is self-interested and can be
malicious. Each user i ∈ U can utilise the service if she is
inside the geographical area, di ∈ D and can change di only
by moving to another location and not by manipulating it. We
discuss further this assumption in Section 8.1. Two users can
communicate only if their distance is within a threshold, so
if a malicious user tries to manipulate his location, he will be
detected. Any user i ∈ U is able to exchange localcoins with
another user j ∈ U by creating one transaction ti→j . User i
needs to broadcast the transaction message that determines
its characteristics. Any user j has a set of trusted users
TN j and this selection is based on social interaction between
users as well as on other device to device interactions [9]. A
realistic requirement of our protocol can be to force users to
select their trusted peers by pairing via NFC. The selection
of TN j depends on j and they are responsible for guaran-
teeing that any received transaction with j as a destination
should be examined before being broadcasted. The forwarding
procedure is explained in detail in Section 5.1. User i owns
some localcoins and in order to prove this ownership she
remembers all the transactions in which she was the receiver.
The transactions are stored in blocks and each block contains
more than one transaction. Each block is based on a previous
block by creating a blockchain. We call this chain distributed
blockchain because each block is duplicated to more than one
but not to every user.
The mobile ad-hoc network nature of our service allows
any other user k in the area to detect the transaction message,
collect the information and contribute to this transaction. Any
collected third party transaction can be used in the future by
user k to earn money in terms of transaction fees and block
fees. Transaction fees motivate mobile users to forward any
received transaction message while block fees motivate mobile
users to store collected transaction messages. We assume that
any user k is self-interested and participates in the system
in order to earn localcoins and use them later. Users that
are not willing to sacrifice part of their resources in order
to participate and earn localcoins are not considered since
they only co-exist with the ones that participate. The more
the active mobile users the better for the protocol and for
that reason we design two types of incentives and also allow
mobile users to stop participating if they want to save their
resources and rejoin again later. We also consider malicious
users that want to attack the protocol and double spend their
localcoins. The robustness of Localcoin against the considered
attacks is presented in Section 6.2. Each transaction ti→j is
described by a set of inputs and outputs as presented in Table
1. h(t∗→i)(·) is the hash of a block that contains a transaction
from anyone to user i. The outputs are: the transferred
amount to user j, oj , the transaction fees trf i→j , the block
fees bf i→j , any possible change oi and the amount of money
user i owns, bi. Bitcoin employs SHA-256 hashing algorithm,
by adapting it in LocalCoin the size of each transaction will be
532 ·#input_transactions+160 bytes. A transaction with less
than 10 transactions as input requires less than a kilobyte of
storage. Transactions are verified in blocks via a mechanism
that is presented in Section 5.2. Observe that a transaction
ti→j additionally: (i) returns, if any, change to i, (ii) transfers
transaction fees to appropriate users, and (iii) pays block
fees if needed. From now on, whenever we are using a past
transaction as an input to a new one, where user i transfers
some money, we assume that oi can be of any of the four
previous types. Each user i keeps a transaction database Ti,
which contains a subset of the distributed block chain and a
set of pending/unverified transactions. This database contains
all the blocks user i needs to verify her own localcoins Bi ⊆ Ti
as well as other blocks in which she was present. At any time,
there are two types of transactions in the network, the verified
ones that can be used as an input to a new transaction and are
stored in the blockchain and the unverified ones. Unverified
transactions are verified in bunches by a distributed consensus
protocol and added to the distributed blockchain.
5 Protocol
We present the basic functionalities of the LocalCoin protocol,
which are categorised into three main categories; transaction
messages (Section 5.1), block creation messages (Section 5.2),
and block management messages (Section 5.3).
5.1 Transaction Messages
send(i,j,ti→j): User i broadcasts a transaction, as described
in Table 1, in order to transfer a number of localcoins to
user j. The send command will broadcast ti→j to all the
nearby users (neighbors). Any user l operates based on the
functionality of the receive(ti→j) procedure as described in
Algorithm 1. Whenever she receives a new transaction, she
checks the sender and receiver and if she is not familiar
with either of them she forwards the message hoping to
collect the transaction fees. If she belongs to the trusted users
of the receiver of the transaction, she examines the input
transactions and signs the message if she is able to validate
all of them. If she receives the message by a trusted user,
she updates her transaction database according to the signed
message. If she is the receiver of the message, she processes
it as explained in procedure process(ti→j ,k). If she received
the same transaction before, she ignores the message unless
it is now signed by another trusted user of j. After receiving
the transaction, j, has to wait for at least mTr of her TN j
trusted users to sign and forward the transaction to her. The
first user who forwards this message to j, regardless of being
in her trusted users, will receive the amount of trf ij if the
transaction is going to be accepted by j and verified by the
network. By accepting the transaction only if a subset of
the trusted network signs and forwards the message to the
receiver, the protocol addresses sybil attacks. User i will not
stop broadcasting the transaction to any users she meets until
she will receive the ack message from user j.
ack(i,j,ti→j): If j receives the message from mTr users
of her trusted network TN j , then she broadcasts an ac-
knowledgement message. This message also determines the
address of the user that will receive the transaction fees. This
message is also forwarded in the similar way to that of the
send command. There is no need for a third round because
Algorithm 1 Pseudocode of the transaction processes
1: procedure Send_ti→j
2: ti→j=create_transaction(), t=sign(ti→j)
3: broadcast(t,my_id)
4: end procedure
1: procedure receive(ti→j,k)
2: if ti→j is a send message and is new then
3: if my_id == j then
4: process(ti→j ,k)
5: else
6: if j ∈ TNmy_id then
7: aware_of_blocks← check(ti→j)
8: if aware_of_blocks == true then
9: t=sign(ti→j)
10: end if
11: end if
12: if k ∈ TNmy_id and ti→j signed by k then
13: update_my_blockchain(), t=sign(ti→j)
14: end if
15: broadcast(t,my_id), Update_pending_List()
16: end if
17: else
18: Match_pending_List(), pending ← pending + 1
19: end if
20: end procedure
1: procedure process(ti→j,k)
2: if ti→j is new then
3: first_notifier(ti→j)← k, trusted(ti→j)← 0
4: end if
5: if k ∈ TNmy_id then
6: trusted(ti→j)← trusted(ti→j) + 1
7: end if
8: if trusted(ti→j) > mTr then
9: ack(i, j, ti→j , first_notifier(ti→j))
10: end if
11: end procedure
user j can only assign trf ij to someone else. Everyone who
receives the acknowledgement updates the knowledge about
which accounts are participating in the transaction.
5.2 Block Creation Messages
build(BLK(ti→j , ti′→j′ , . . .)): Whenever a user l collects BS
transactions (both send and ack), that are not yet verified,
she tries to build a new block. For that she needs to agree with
mVu−1 other users about the validity of the BS transactions
in order to reach to a consensus [20]. Her signed message
also contains her location, dl and a current value of average
distance vector d. The distance vector has BS entries and
each entry has the average distance between the users who
verified the transaction.
verify(BLK′(ti→j , ti′→j′ , . . .)): The first mVu users who
verify all the transactions in the create message and have
average distance between each other bigger that aVd will
share the block fees. Every user k who receives a verify
message checks her database for unverified transactions and if
she has any of the included in the message she signs them and
forwards the message. Before forwarding the message, user
k updates the distance entries, which she has signed. If she
6Algorithm 2 Pseudocode of block creation processes
1: procedure BuildBlock(BLK(ti→j , ti′→j′ , . . .))
2: block ← ti→j , ti′→j′ , . . ., locations← 0
3: locations(0) = my_GPS
4: broadcast(block, locations);
5: end procedure
1: procedure Receive(block, locations)
2: [is_valid, signed]← V erify(block)
3: if is_valid then
4: avdist← Average_Distance(locations)
5: if avdist > aVd then
6: broadcast(created_block)
7: end if
8: else
9: broadcast("double spending attempt detected")
10: end if
11: end procedure
detects a double spending attempt she deletes her entry if it
has a later time-stamp or she signs her entry and adds it into
the message if it has an earlier time-stamp. In case of double
spending detection, user k sets the entry for the corresponding
transaction to 0 and attaches and signs her detected pair with
a newer timestamp. Whenever a user receives a verify message
with the location of the user not being in her coverage radius,
(i) she verifies any transaction she can verify, (ii) she notes
that the location of the receiver is not in her coverage radius
and she marks the location entry as false and then (iii) she
broadcasts the message.
create(BLK′′(ti→j , ti′′→j′′ , . . .)): Users who receive a mes-
sage with transactions that are verified mVu times and have
average distance bigger than aVd apart from forwarding the
message they also broadcast a create message that defines the
users who will share the block fees. Before broadcasting the
create message, they examine if there is any entry of the mVu
that has been marked by another user as false and in such
case, these entries are not considered in the block creation.
5.3 Block Management Messages
delete(i,t∗→i): We propose a garbage collection functionality
that deletes every transaction that is not useful. The delete
command is triggered after the create command in order to
delete all the input transactions to the freshly verified ones
since they can not be used any more. After deleting all the
transactions of one block, the whole block is deleted. The
motivation behind this process is to keep the size of the
distributed block chain as storage efficient as possible because
the mobile devices are not able to dedicate significant amount
of storage for that3.
sync(t): Any user can call sync function by giving only
the time-stamp of her last update. By doing so, any nearby
trusted user will send the newly verified transactions as well
as the hash of the ones that have been deleted.
5.4 The Blockchain Evolution
If we have Λ transaction pairs per time unit, then we will
have, in the long term, Λ/BS blocks per time unit. If one
3. Bitcoin’s blockchain is increasing with a rate of more than 200
MB per day [4].
Fig. 2: A zoom view of one block with the pointers of each
transaction to its parent block(s). For the sake of presentation
we show that each transaction has only one parent.
transaction ti→j uses on average Li→j transactions as an
input then one block deletes
∑BS
k=1 L
k
i→j links to past blocks.
In order to become one block orphan, all its transactions
need to be unpointed. Each transaction is pointed by 4 links,
so this block will be deleted approximately when 4 ∗ BS
transactions that point to that block are deleted. However,
we cannot predict after how many block creations this will
happen. Whenever a new block is created, the garbage collec-
tion process updates the past blocks on which the inputted
transactions where placed. For any used transaction, in the
creation of the new block, we delete the pointers to the parents
of the used transactions. Figure 2 is a pictorial view of where
one transaction of the nine in the rightmost block is used as an
input to a new transaction. All the links to the parent blocks
of this transaction will then be deleted. If a block has no child
pointers pointing at it, it is deleted and the block that is after
it then points to the one before it.
5.5 Parameters of LocalCoin
The performance of LocalCoin depends on multiple parame-
ters. User availability and position determine the connectivity
between the users and the ability to verify new transactions
but these parameters are not regulatable by LocalCoin. On
the other hand, the number of the trusted users needed for
one transaction to be accepted (mTr), the amount of the
transactions in each block (BS), the number of the users need
to verify the creation of one block (mVu) and the average
distance between the users who verify the block (aVd), affects
the performance of LocalCoin and characterises the trade-
off between the time needed to verify a new transaction,
the security against double spending and the increase in the
stored data. However, since LocalCoin can be categorised as
a location based service, all four parameters can be adjusted
based on the required transaction speed and the maximum
risk of double spending as well as the rate of the creation of a
new block.
6 Analysis
In this section we analyse and validate the performance of
LocalCoin. Section 6.1 introduces the connectivity condi-
tions under which the protocol is applicable and Section 6.2
presents the circumstances where a malicious user is able to
successfully double spend some localcoins. Given that users’
mobility increases the capacity of multihop wireless networks
[22], we examine the worst-case performance of LocalCoin by
considering non moving users.
6.1 Reachability
Each user i is located at di ∈ D and any other user j
located in the coverage area of i, Di (i.e j ∈ Di) is able to
receive any message i broadcasts. Practically, the coverage
7area of each user has a radius comparatively close to the
coverage area of WiFi direct. We assume that every user
has the same normalised coverage radius and we denote it
as rcov = Wifi_direct_coverageArea_of_the_supported_service . Given the location of
each user and the normalised coverage radius we produce a
2-dimensional random geometric graph (RGC) GD(U , rcov) .
The number of connected components of GD(U , rcov) depends
on |U| and rcov and has a subcritical and a supercritical phase.
In the subcritical phase the number of connected components
is large while in the supercritical phase it converges to one. A
well known result for d-dimensional random geometric graphs
is the following [23], [35]:
Lemma 1. For |U|rdcov ≥ 2 log |U| the GdD(|U|, rcov) is
(1) connected with probability at least 1− 1|U|2 ,
(2) r-regular and
(3) the degree of every user, with high probability, is
pid/2
Γ(1+d/2)nr
d(1 + o(1)).
Where Γ(·) is the Gamma function and given that we
consider a 2-dimensional graph (d = 2), Γ(2) = 1. We
can rewrite the lemma as: If |U|log |U| ≥ 2r2cov , G(|U|, rcov)
is regular with degree dD = pi|U|r2cov(1 + o(1)). Given
a β-expander dD-regular graph, for every set S ⊂
U , |S| ≤ |U|/2, holds out(S) ≥ β|S|. Where: out(S) =
|{{u, v}|{u, v} ∈ GD(|U|, rcov), u ∈ S, v /∈ S}|
Authors of [15], [27] state that if the nodes of the random
geometric graph are produced by Poisson point process in
the 2 dimensions, its density should be in the spectrum
of [0.696, 3.372]. Simulation results converge to 1.44. If for
example the subscribed users are 1000 and the coverage radius
of wifi-direct is 200 meters the users will be able to form a
connected graph with probability 0.999999 if the area of the
supported service is less than pi
√
2
31011 ≈ 0.8km2.
Suppose user i wants to give some localcoins to user j. User
i has dD neighboors and by the properties of the expander
graphs, there are (1 + dU )(1 + β)l users at l hops from i.
We continue expanding from i until the reachable set of users
Vi has more than |U|/2 users. User j may not be among
them. However, if we expand from user j in the same way, we
eventually obtain a set Vj of more than |U|/2 users reachable
from j. The sets Vi and Vj both contain more than |U|/2 users
so they must overlap. The overlap contains users on a path
from i to j. In this way, we have shown that:
Theorem 1. For any pair of users i and j, in the same
connected component, there is a path of length at most
2(l+ 1) from i to j, where l = log(1+β) U2dD . The larger the
value of β, the shorter the path between any two users.
In LocalCoin protocol, j has to be connected with at least
mTr ∈ TN j in order to accept the transaction. Theorem 1
ensures that if user i wants to transfer some localcoins to user
j the only requirement is that user j be connected with at
least mTr users of her trusted network. The probability of the
transaction to be successful depends on two main factors. The
most important factor is both i and j must belong in the same
component c, that is : p(i ∈ c) · p(j ∈ c) = |%c| · |%c| =
|%c|2. Where |%c| is the fraction of the users that belong to
Symbol Meaning
di Location of user i in area of consideration D.
rcov Normalised coverage area.
U(A) The users that are located in area A.
M Set of colluders. The users that help a mali-
cious user m to double spend a localcoin.
R The area that is controled by malicious user
m who tries to double spend a localcoin.
TABLE 2: Notation table with frequently used symbols.
component c. The second factor is to have at leastmTr ⊂ TN j
of j’s trusted users in the component. This probability equals:
|TNj |∑
l=mTr
(
TN j
l
)
(p · |%c|)l(1− p · |%c|)TNj−l (1)
Where p is the probability of one user who belongs to the
trusted network of j to be able to sign i’s message. It is worth
mentioning that in the case of moving users, the probability
of having a successful transaction is increasing because mobile
users can forward the received transactions whenever they
make new neighbours.
6.2 Robustness Against Attacks
Malicious users may try to attack LocalCoin in various ways
and in case of a successful attack they may be able to steal
localcoins from other users or just harm the protocol. There
are two general categories of attacks in LocalCoin, the ones
that are based on the proof-of-ownership and the ones that
are based on double spending. In this Section we focus on
malicious users who want to earn localcoins via double spend-
ing since this is the most popular attack on cryptocurrencies.
Attacks where mobile users input fake transactions and try
to send them to other users will not be successful since the
trusted users of the recipient will not sign them but such
attacks will consume the resources of the mobile users that
forwarded them. Let us assume that a malicious userm wants
to double spend a localcoin. We consider two types of attacks:
Passive: The attacker initiates two transactions to two
different receivers and broadcasts them to two different con-
nected components of the network. If there is only a single
connected component, the attempt will be detected and hence
there must exist at least two disjoint components for m to be
successful in double spending. In Section 6.2.1 we show that
probability of such attack decreases quadratically in |U|.
Active: Another possible attack is the one where m is
able, with the help of some colluders (M), to control an areaR
and split D into more than one disconnected parts artificially.
We discuss such attack in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3.
In both types of attacks we assume that the trusted users
who are asked to verify transactions are aware of every block.
6.2.1 A Passive double spending attack
In order for double spending to be successful, m has to
employ enough colluders in order to cheat at least 2mVu other
users. Each recipient of the fake transaction will wait until
mVu of her trusted nodes will forward her the fake message.
Depending on BS, mVu and aVd the probability of double
spending is changing. However, the wireless medium does not
8allow m to only select a number of users. Given that mTr
users from both receivers are aware of m’s ability to initiate
this transaction, we examine how the remaining parameters
affect the difficulty of double spending:
BS: The lower the number of transactions in one block the
faster each block can be created and this allows m to try to
double spend the same input and create two new blocks. If the
connectivity graph between the users is partitioned, double
spending is possible.
mVu: The higher the number of users needed to verify one
transaction the more m needs to collaborate with him. For
that, Lemma 1 can not hold and the connectivity graph has
to be in the subcritical phase.
aVd: The higher the value of aVd the most difficult it is for
m to double spend. Each user has on average dD neighbours
and any two users can communicate if the distance between
them is less than rcov, then if λ = aVd/rcov, λ · dD users will
receive the request for fake block creation.
We can paraphrase Lemma 1 and state that:
Theorem 2.
If |U|
(
aVd
λ
)2
≥ 2 log |U| and λdD > |U|2 ,double
spending is possible with probability at most 1/|U|2.
6.2.2 Virtual-cut attack: An active double spending attack in
static graphs
Let us assume that the users’ positions, {di}, are distributed
uniformly and are static. As proved in the previous subsection,
it is difficult to double spend a localcoin in the induced
random graph as with high probability it consists of one major
component. However, a malicious user may have detailed
knowledge of the graph topology and he may artificially create
a virtual cut by controlling users that transmit messages
selectively to one part of the graph only. If a malicious user
is able to double spend a localcoin by such trick, we say he is
successful in a virtual-cut attack.
To complete a transaction in both components, each must
contain enough users to verify the transaction and are at least
aVd apart. This provides a lower bound on the number of
users that must be controlled to create a suitable cut. Suppose
a malicious user manages to induce an artificial cut as shown
in Figure 3. He partitions the users into two components, A1
with U(A1) users andA2 with U(A2) users by controlling users
in region B. Let A = A1 \ B and the number of the users in
A are |A| = α |U|2 . Also, let the average distance between any
pair of users within A to be γaVd. That is,∑
i,j|i,j∈A
|di − dj |
|A|/2(|A| − 1) = γaVd. (2)
Let the average distance of a user in region B with a user
in regions A or B to be ζaVd. The malicious user has to ensure
that the average distance of any pair of users who agree the
transaction is at least aVd. Let malicious user selectsM users
from region B for block creation with U(A1). She needs to
ensure:
αζ|M| |U|2 aVd + ζ |M|
2
4 aVd + γ
α2|U|2
4 aVd
α|M| |U|2 + |M|
2
4 +
α2|U|2
4
> aVd ⇔
2α|M||U|(ζ − 1) + |M|2(ζ − 1) + α2|U|2(γ − 1) > 0
A1 B 2A
Fig. 3: Area partitioning for attempting double spending.
If the malicious user chooses to (i) increase ζ or (ii)
decrease α and γ, the region B will enlarge and thus he will
need to add more users intoM. Intuitively, to decrease |M|
he needs, higher ζ, or smaller values of α which in turn again
need to control a bigger percentage of U and increase |M|.
Example: For α = 1, γ = 1/2 and ζ = 1.5, m has to
control at least |M| ≥ (√2 − 1)|U| or over 41% of the
users.
r
r'
r
r'
Fig. 4: Area controling for attempting double spending.
Note that the above double spending attack is one of the
possible attack and an attacker can isolate a region R by
controlling all the users in a specific region. If he manages
to control all the users in the shaded region, as shown in
Figure 4, he can successfully create two virtual disconnected
components in the connected graph. In order to block any
message flow between the regions, r′ > r + 2rcov has to hold.
That is, he needs to cover an area the size of at least
R = pi(r′2 − (r′ − 2rcov)2) = 4pircov(r′ − rcov) (3)
The attacker can further optimize the attack by locating
one of the two virtual components in a corner, so as to reduce
the area he needs to control (Fig. 4). In a region A, the
average distance between any two users placed with a uniform
distribution is d˜r′ (Under extensive simulations d˜ = 0.45). In
LocalCoin protocol, a transaction will be completed in A if
the average distance between any two users is at least aVd.
That is, d˜r′ > aVd. The attacker can reduce the area that
he needs to control by trying to push A further into a corner
but he cannot reduce r′ < aVd
d˜
. Thus to create two successful
transactions, one on A and one in the remaining area D \ A,
before he gets detected, he needs to control all the users in an
area the size of:
R = 14pi
(
(r′)2 − (r′ − 2rcov)2
)
= pircov(r′ − rcov)
> pircov(
aVd
d˜
− rcov) (4)
9We assume that the users are uniformly distributed on
a unit square. The average distance between any two users
on any disc of radius r inside this unit square is d¯r (Under
extensive simulations d¯ = 0.903). In LocalCoin protocol, we
desire the information about each transaction to reach at least
50% of the users at the time of accepting a transaction. Thus,
pir2 > 0.5 which translates to aVd > 0.36. A higher value of
aVd will slow down transactions’ verification rate but it will
increase security.
Example: For aVd = 13 and rcov = 0.05, the malicious
user needs to control a region which is 0.1085 of D. As
all the users are uniformly distributed on D, it amounts
to controlling 10.85% of U .
Theorem 3. To be able to double spend a LocalCoin
by a virtual cut, an attacker needs to control at least
R > pircov(aVdd˜ − rcov) fraction of the users, under the
assumption that all the users are uniformly distributed
and are static.
6.2.3 Virtual-cut Attack: An active double spending attack in
dynamic networks
In reality, even if the attacker colludes withM : |M| > |R||D|
other users and places them appropriately to create two
virtual components in the network. The remaining U\M users
may be moving dynamically. So at the time when he plants a
double spending attack, for the attack to be successful, none
of these |U| − |M| users should be placed in R. Thus the
probability that such the double spend attack by controlling
large number of users to be successful is
|R|
|D|
(|U|−|M|)
(5)
Example: For |R||D| ≈ 10% and |U| − |M| ≥ 100, the
probability of a successful attack is at most 10−6.
The assumptions made on the analysis of LocalCoin are
discussed in Section 8.1.
7 Performance Evaluation of LocalCoin
We conduct a set of simulations in static and dynamic graphs.
The static random geometric graphs are produced with MAT-
LAB (Section 7.1). We implement an event driven simulator in
JAVA for dynamic graphs using real mobility traces (Section
7.2) and in order to scale up the number of the mobile users,
we use the ONE simulator [26] (Section 7.3). After proving,
in Section 6, that double spending is improbable in fully
connected mobile ad-hoc networks, we investigate scenarios
where the users are not fully connected in order to depict the
robustness of LocalCoin.
7.1 Evaluation with RGGs
In the static analysis, we focus on the characteristics of the
produced RGGs and their affect on LocalCoin. The simu-
lations on static graphs are important because in the case
where users are not moving, a malicious user m has the
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Fig. 5: The connected components and the fraction of the
users in the major component in a [0, 1]× [0, 1] area.
highest chances to successfully double spend some localcoins.
We distribute uniformly the users U in a [0, 1] × [0, 1] area
and we study the effect of |U| and rcov on the number
of connected components and the fraction of users in the
largest connected component. Figure 5a shows how |U| affects
the number of connected components and the size of the
major connected component for three different values rcov.
Fig. 8: Non-uniform
distribution of users.
Figure 5b shows how rcov affects
the aforementioned quantities for two
different user placements. Given that
the uniform distribution of U is not a
realistic case, we split the examined
area into a 10 by 10 grid of equally
spaced 100 cells, where the number
of users in each cell is determined by
a Poisson distribution with different
parameter. Figure 8 depicts the used
grid and the darkness of each cell
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Fig. 6: Analysis of LocalCoin using users’ mobility from Infocom 05, Infocom 06 and Humanet traces.
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Fig. 7: Average distance between a randomly selected user
with all the other users.
depicts its populatiry. The average number of the total users
is still 1000. In this non uniform case, the major component is
formed for smaller values of rcov. In the case of static graphs,
double spending is possible when the number of connected
components is more than 1,mVu is smaller than the number of
the users in the components selected to double spend and aVd
is small enough to apply for the users in each component. This
requires at least two large components with roughly equal
size. From our simulations, for |U| = 1000 and rcov = 0.5,
the major component contains more than 90% of the users.
As only one big component is getting formed the information
about each transaction will spread in the network very easily.
Figure 7 presents the distribution of the users in the
examined area and it is useful to understand the impact
of the constraint of the average distance between the users
who verify the creation of a new block on the spread of the
block creation process in the whole area. In order to produce
the figure, we placed randomly 1000 and 2000 users and we
selected randomly one of them and we measure the distance
of all the other users with the selected one. Figure 7 shows
that even if the imposed threshold in the creation of a block
is less that 30% of the maximum possible value, more than
50% of the users will be informed about the creation process.
In order to examine LocalCoin in more realistic cases, we
consider mobile users in the next two subsections.
7.2 Evaluation with Mobility Traces
We implement an event-driven simulator in Java in order to
depict the performance of LocalCoin. We used three datasets,
Infocom’05 and Infocom’06 from the Haggle project [38] and
Humanet [6], which contain user mobility traces in different
environments. The duration of the simulation is one day. We
select the first day of the first two datasets, while Humanet is
one day long. We considered all the mobile users, which are
41, 78 and 56 respectively.
We introduce the datasets using the concepts of Transac-
tion Rate and Transaction Spread. We define transaction
rate as the fraction of the completed transactions and the
transaction spread as the average fraction of the users that
have stored the transaction. Figures 6a, 6b and 6c show
the average time needed for one transaction to reach its
destination and the transaction rate for different number
of transactions per user. The receiver and the time of the
transaction occurrence are generated uniformly between the
users and the day. Figure 9, illustrates the transaction spread
in the case where each user initiates one transaction at the
beginning of the day. Note that all datasets are sparse with
small number of users and hence, the transaction spread is
slow resulting into the small values of transaction rate and
transaction spread. This set of figures is needed to explain
and understand the results produced by the simulation of a
malicious user in these three traces.
Next, we examine the chances a malicious user (m) has
to deliver multiple transactions with the same input (fake
transactions) to more than one users. m tries to double
spend by making at least two of the receivers of his fake
transactions to accept them. However, double spending will
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Fig. 11: Accepted Fake Transactions.
not be successful before the creation of two blocks that contain
these fake transactions, which is not possible if aVd is large
enough. To simulate a double spending attack: m creates
2, 3, 5 or 10 fake transactions. Figures 6d, 6e and 6f show
the average transaction spread of the fake transactions for
variable number of colluders (M). Multiple copies of the same
transaction decrease the average spread of the fake transaction
because the normal users (U \ M) receive at least two fake
transactions with higher probability. Furthermore, most of
these duplicates are stored by the colluders and not by the
normal users. Figure 10 shows the spread of the duplicates
in U and in U \ M for the case of 5 fake transactions and
|M| = 0.5|U|. On average, less than 2% of the normal
users receive the fake transactions. Only the first copy has
spread like a normal transaction while the spread of others is
decreasing dramatically since normal users are familiar with
the first ones. Figure 11 shows the probability of at least
one of the receivers of the fake transactions to accept the
transaction. For analysis purpose, we make it easier for m
by using mTr = 0. Even in this setting, the chance ofm being
successful in making a receiver to accept a fake transaction is
< 1%. Note that successful transaction does not mean that
the transaction is accepted in blockchain but it is pending.
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Fig. 12: Analysis of LocalCoin protocol using ONE [26].
7.3 Evaluation with ONE simulator
We implement LocalCoin on ONE simulator to scrutinize its
behaviour on a larger scale and examine how users’ speed
and coverage radius affect the chances of a malicious user
to double spend. We consider a 4km2 area in the center of
a Metropolitan city and a |U| = 1000 mobile users. As a
mobility pattern we use shortest path map based movement.
Figures 12a and 12b demonstrate the spread of a nor-
mal transaction. In Figure 12a, the coverage radius of every
broadcast is 100 meters while in Figure 12b it is 50 meters4.
Figure 12a shows that even if a malicious user has |M| = 100
colluders to forward his fake transaction he does not have
enough time to create a second fake transaction because in less
than a minute almost all the users in the area will be informed
of her transaction. The walking speed of the users has little
influence on this case. However, if the coverage radius is 50
meters (Figure 12b), the walking speed matters. In case of the
slow movement (0.1-0.5 km/h) it takes around 3 minutes for
one broadcasted message to reach more than half of the users
while in the case of normal walking (0.5-1.5 km/h) it takes
less than 1 minute.
In order to examine more thoroughly the case when cheat-
ing is still possible, we consider the case of normally walking
users (0.5 - 1.5 km/h) and coverage radius of 50 meters. A
malicious user m creates two fake transactions and randomly
selects the receivers of them. We examine three settings that
differ in the time between the creation of the fake transactions.
Figure 12c depicts how the fraction of the colluders |M||U| affects
m’s chances to deliver the two fake transactions. In the first
setting,m is not able to deliver 2 fake transactions, regardless
of |M|, because the time difference in the creation of the 2
them is only 10 seconds and m is in contact with the same
users. In the second setting the time difference is 1 minute
and m is able to successfully deliver two fake transactions but
this happens either because he selects two users who have
4. Wifi-direct supports a coverage radius of 200 meters but we
expect it to drop radically in crowded urban areas.
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not met yet or have not met the same other users. In the
third setting, m initiates the two transactions with 2 minutes
difference. In this setting,m, delays the creation of the second
fake transaction as much as possible in order to move as far as
possible from the users that have the first transaction. Then,
he is able to find a remote user that does not have the first
transaction ∼ 60% of the times, when half of the users in the
network are assisting him. But If he wait a bit more (e.g. 30
more seconds), the first transaction will be spread in all the
network, as shown in Figure 12b (after 150 seconds > 99%
have received the first transaction).
It is worth reminding that, in the examined scenarios, we
present the cases when a mobile user can be cheated by a
malicious one in terms of accepting the transaction. However,
this does not mean that the malicious user managed to double
spend some localcoins. In order to succeed in that, two users
have to initiate block creations and succssfully verify both of
these blocks. The necessity for high density comes from this
need to allow the block creation procedure to both manage to
spread in a big part of the network and detect the attempts
for double spending.
In summary, all three evaluation subsections are focused
on describing the area with high connectivity, in which we
argue that LocalCoin is applicable. This applicability depends
on whether a normal transaction is properly spread to the
whole network and a fake one is not spread and not verified.
We examined both the case where the users are not moving
and when they are moving either based on some available
traces or by simulating their movement with the ONE simu-
lator. In more detail, when users are static, we show that for a
reasonable scenario, i.e., |U| = 1000, rcov = 0.05 the area con-
sists of one major component implying feasibility of LocalCoin
and impossibility of double spending attacks. When the users
are walking, we show that with an average movement speed of
1kmph, they can complete their transactions in seconds while
malicious users, even if they manage to find the proper time
to initiate a fake transaction, a few minutes after that they
will be detected in the block creation phase.
8 Discussion
We analysed LocalCoin by considering static graphs that are
formed as random geometric graphs of which nodes are users’
locations and the coverage area of the used wireless technology
compared with the deployment area dictates whether two
nodes are close enough to be connected. Static networks
provide a lower bound in the performance of the protocol. In
the case of mobile users, LocalCoin performs better because
the transactions are more easily flooded to users and any mali-
cious user has to not only consider the locations of the normal
users but also their mobility, which is a very difficult task.
An analysis of mobile users with different mobility patterns
is part of our future work. It is notable that a conservative
selection of the LocalCoin parameters (i.e., high values for
mTr , BS,mVu and aVd) can guarantee that double spending
is not possible, however the performance of the protocol, in
terms of time, will be hindered.
8.1 Discussion about the assumptions of the analysis
The analysis presented in Section 6 is based on three major as-
sumptions: (A1) The mobile users are uniformly distributed
in the service area. (A2) The mobile users can not hack
their location. (A3) The colluders of a malicious user are
preselected and a malicious user is not able to bribe a normal
user during the double spending attack. Below we discuss the
reasons that drove us to these three assumptions:
(A1) The motivation behind distributing uniformly the
mobile users in the examined area is that it makes the func-
tionality of LocalCoin more challenging. Although it would
be easier for a malicious user to identify critical locations
to occupy if the users were not uniformly distributed, it
would be also easier during the implementation of LocalCoin
and the selection of its tuning parameters, to make such
locations insufficient to create a virtual cut that can lead to
a successful double spending attack. Figure 5 shows that a
major connected component can be formed more easily in the
case where the users are not uniformly distributed.
(A2) Although users’ actual location is a core component
of LocalCoin and a malicious user may consider asking a set of
colluders to lie about their location and help him on double-
spending, this is against his interest because the non-colluding
neighbours of the colluders will immediately detect the attack
and discard the block. Normal users know their location and
the average coverage radius, so LocalCoin can handle such
attacks by forcing each user to check the locations that her
neighbours put during the block creation process. A parallel
to the block verification mechanism can detect the location
manipulation attempts and intercept the double spending
attacks. Given that the actual locations are only needed for
the calculation of the average distance between the verifiers of
a block, the block creation and verification messages can be
enlarged to contain the ids of the neighbours each verifier has
when signing the block. Then the rule that dictates when a
block can be created (i.e. when the average distance between
the verifiers is higher than aV d) can be complemented by
a second one that requires the number of the distinct users
that are neighbours of the verifiers to be higher than a
threshold. Although the incentives for each user to participate
in such mechanism are not presented and analysed in detail,
a simple defence mechanism that detects and punishes all
the participants every time a location manipulation has been
detected can be enough to create the necessary bias against
the malicious users.
(A3)Our assumption is based on the fact that we envision
LocalCoin to work on off-the-shelf mobile devices whose own-
ers are using them on their needs while LocalCoin is running
on the background. Mobile users are not aware of message
exchange and the only way for a malicious user to double-
spend is to implement another version of LocalCoin and install
it in his colluders.
8.2 Getting assistance from a fixed network
It is worth mentioning that LocalCoin can benefit from fixed
networks in the small scale (university campus scale) to
increase the speed of the message forwarding and decrease
the importance of user’s density. The access points of a fixed
network can be treated as normal users who do not have
storage capabilities (i.e. TAP = ∅, ∀ access point) and do
not compete for the transaction fees but broadcast all the
incoming messages to the other nodes of the fixed network
who broadcast the messages to the associated mobile devices.
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Moreover, the access points can be used for the block creation
process as a guarantee for the average distance between
the mobile users. In more detail, each user who verifies the
creation of a new block can attach a recently signed message
that she received from the closest AP in order to provide
a robust estimation of her location. However, these extra
functionalities that are provided by a fixed network can only
improve the performance of LocalCoin on the practical level.
D2D architectures, with main representative being the
5G, are becoming more and more popular. The Wifi-direct
technology is getting more mature and is adapted by many
customer products, while, the design of LTE-direct is moving
in this route. Motivated by advances in this direction and
considering that any existing infrastructure, like an institu-
tional network in a university campus, can only improve the
coverage of LocalCoin, we argue that protocols like LocalCoin
are applicable and implementable.
8.3 Power cost of LocalCoin
LocalCoin, in contrast to Bitcoin, employs a defence mecha-
nism against double spending that does not require powerful
CPUs but requires an amount of messages to be exchanges
between the mobile users. Based on measurements of the
power consumption of the WiFi interface we estimate that
a transaction with size 1 kilobyte consumes 0.00048/0.0004
joules when transmitted/received [8]. Although there exist
studies that show that the power needs of WiFi is higher that
the CPU [7], LocalCoin does not transfer messages 100% of
the time. A detailed analysis of the power consumption of
LocalCoin is part of our future work.
9 Future Work
In this work we analysed in detail the probability of a success-
ful double spending, our next step is to analyse the proposed
distributed blockchain and provide bounds regarding the re-
quired number of verifiers each users should have, the number
of the blocks each user should store, on average, in order for
the protocol to be functional and the relationship between
the number of the stored blocks and earnings from the fees.
Our future extensions of LocalCoin will be also focused on
building defence mechanisms against other types of attacks
where mobile users form coalitions and perform abnormally
without their incentives being aligned with the incentives of
the normal mobile users.
10 Conclusion
In conclusion, LocalCoin is a decentralised cryptocurrency
built on principles similar to Bitcoin but avoids any need of
the Internet and computing overheads. We used a distributed
blockchain structure to store the produced transactions in the
form of blocks and we proposed a set of four parameters to
show the existing trade-offs in our proposal due to the mobile
ad-hoc nature. These 4 parameters can be adjusted to provide
the required security guarantees, in terms of double spending,
and at the same time affect the maximum transaction rate.
LocalCoin is applicable in dense areas of mobile users and if
the users are fully connected, the double spending is impossi-
ble.
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